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This outlaw behavior has typically met 
with international outrage and high-minded 
demands that North Korea be held account-
able. In the end, however, the United States 
and the major regional players – China, Japan, 
South Korea and Russia – conclude they have 
little to gain and much to lose from confron-
tation. Sanctions are watered down, and 
North Korea hints that it could be bribed to 
refrain from further bad behavior. 
This time around is probably no different. 
But the stakes seem especially high because 
the economy – and the regime that has man-
aged it so badly – once again seem to be tee-
tering. There has been much speculation not 
only about the succession, but also about the 
ability of North Korea’s ruling gang to survive. 
Since the demise in 1994 of Kim Il-Sung 
(Great Leader, who had led the country since 
1948), observers have periodically predicted 
has been both a puzzle and an irritant to the interna-
tional community for more than half a century. This highly secretive autocratic state 
possesses nuclear weapons, yet it depends on handouts to stave off mass famine. And 
just when it seems to be inching toward a more rational relationship with its neigh-
bors, an incident like the March 2010 sinking of a South Korean navy ship, Cheonan, 
reminds the outside world about how 
little it knows about how North Korea 
makes policy decisions.
North Korea
BoB Looney teaches economics at the naval 
Postgraduate School in California.
by  rober t  l ooney








the sudden collapse of the government in the 
face of rumors that Kim Jong-Il (Dear Leader, 
who succeeded his father) was in failing 
health. However, as the regime has survived 
economic crisis after crisis while maintaining 
one of the dozen largest conventional mili-
tary establishments in the world, such predic-
tions have become increasingly guarded.
Optimists believe that concessions to 
North Korea (combined with pressure from 
China) can mute its rogue tendencies. Pessi-
mists point to a long history of abominable 
behavior, from the bombing murder of most 
of the South Korean government’s cabinet in 
1983, to its massive currency-counterfeiting 
and cigarette-smuggling operations, to its use 
of Japan as a missile-testing range. They insist 
that only relentless pressure through compre-
hensive economic sanctions will modify the 
country’s belligerency. 
Both camps, however, agree that progress 
in the economic and security arenas go hand 
in hand. Economic liberalization would im-
prove economic performance and give the re-
gime a bigger stake in the community of na-
tions. By contrast, a retreat into ever-greater 
rigidity would put China, South Korea and 
Japan at greater risk of fallout – figurative and 
literal. A big question, then, in assessing 
North Korea’s impact on the region is how 
the economy will evolve in coming years.
organized crime
Korea was a colony of Japan from 1905 until 
the end of World War II, and the North was 
briefly under the direct control of the Soviet 
Union thereafter. So the history of an inde-
pendent North Korea really only begins in 
1948. It is relatively well endowed with miner-
als, including coal and metal ores, though 
conspicuously lacking in oil and natural gas. 
By contrast, it has little arable land and highly 
variable weather – a glaring weakness because 
the leadership is committed to self-sufficiency 
in food. 
The work force is literate, and there seem 
to be no fundamental cultural barriers to 
making it far more productive. But as long as 
the economy is so poorly managed, the ques-
tion is moot. Handicapped by infrastructure 
and industrial capital stock that are hope-
lessly out of date, GDP per capita is a miser-
able $1,900 annually in purchasing power 
terms – less than that of Sudan, Laos or Cam-
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bodia, and only a tad more than Chad. 
The impact of adherence to a philosophy of 
extreme self-reliance, combined with flat-
footed central planning, has been devastating. 
From 1995 to 1998, famine killed as many as 
one million people. Even in the best of times 
North Korea operates its obsolete manufactur-
ing sector at only a small fraction of capacity 
for lack of fuel and spare parts. Meanwhile, 
the leadership’s obsession with top-down 
control denies the economy the benefits of 
relatively cheap modern technologies. Mobile 
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phones and Internet access are forbidden to 
all but the elite, and radio and television sets 
are manufactured to receive only government 
stations. Unauthorized travel within the 
country is banned.
Large segments of the population live in 
extreme deprivation. Goods available to a 
vast majority of North Korea’s 23 million citi-
zens are mainly agricultural products – the 
sector employs about 40 percent of the popu-
lation. The bulk of the country’s very limited 
resources go to maintaining a supersized 
army, developing and producing nuclear 
weapons and missile delivery systems, and 
providing a decent standard of living for the 
political and military elite.
Military control of so large a share of the na-
tion’s resources – between 15 and 30 percent of 
GDP – stemmed from Kim Jong-Il’s early pri-
orities. Instead of following China and other 
communist states toward market-based re-
forms after the death of the nation’s patriarch, 
Kim Jong-Il invested heavily in the care and 
feeding of the military as a means of stabilizing 
his power. This strategy, dubbed “military-first 
politics” by Dear Leader himself, offered the 
bonus of protecting the regime against foreign 
threats, both real and imaginary. 
Kim put forth an ingenious public ratio-
nale for this approach, turning the traditional 
“guns versus butter” trade-off on its head. He 
argued that defense would serve as the lead-
ing sector to spur development in other sec-
tors – even in agriculture and light industry. 
This isn’t quite as dumb as its sounds: in the 
post-Mao period, China permitted its armed 
force to develop its own diversified industrial 
base, which arguably served as an intermedi-
ate step toward market-based decentraliza-
tion by giving the officer corps a direct inter-
est in industrial productivity. But there isn’t a 
shred of evidence that the approach has 
worked in North Korea.
Another leg to Kim’s strategy for regime 
survival is what Charles Wolf of Rand calls 
the “court economy,” a patronage system of 
sorts that funnels consumer goods to the na-
tion’s bureaucratic elite in return for support 
and a sense of legitimacy. Yet a third leg is the 
regime’s organized-crime strategy in eco-
nomic dealings with the rest of the world, 
which Kim uses to pay for the first two.
After defaulting on international debt in the 
1970s, North Korea was frozen out of foreign 
capital markets and came to rely increasingly 
on illicit activities like drug trafficking, cur-
rency counterfeiting and insurance fraud to 
generate foreign exchange. Such crime-for-
profit activities are reportedly orchestrated by 
a special office under the direction of the ruling 
Korean Workers Party. It is a surprisingly so-
phisticated operation, equal to the best of orga-
nized crime elsewhere. Indeed, there is consid-
erable evidence that some of these activities 
involve complex transnational relations with 
various rogue-state and criminal networks.
North Korea’s “rent seeking” also includes 
extortion: international payments for “pro-
tective services” – mainly promises to refrain 
from aggressive actions like the development 
of nuclear weapons and missile delivery sys-
tems. Payments often take the form of foreign 
aid in hard currency or commodity deliveries 
of fuel or food. Overall, the scale of this activ-
ity has been sufficient to provide a relatively 
comfortable life for North Korea’s elite in the 
midst of economic ruin. 
Unless things change drastically, the forty-
fold GDP disparity between South and North 
Korea can be expected to widen because of 
the vicious circle in which the North has be-
come entrapped. The circle begins with the 
country’s economy in which state-planned 
and managed operations are inherently inef-
ficient, a military-first policy drains resources 
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from potentially productive sectors and the 
elite must be kept in the style to which it has 
grown accustomed. The resulting scarcities, 
in turn, prevent the country from improving 
infrastructure and investing in modern 
equipment, which leads to further deteriora-
tion in industrial and agricultural productiv-
ity. Low agricultural productivity leads to 
malnutrition, which diminishes labor force 
productivity. And since the elite’s position 
has been secured by policies that inhibit 
growth, there is little incentive to change.
the future as revealed by the past
Though the motives of North Korea’s leaders 
are open to interpretation, their past machi-
nations do offer some insight into how the 
government will act in a period of economic 
trauma and transition in leadership. Consider 
some scenarios.
Muddling Through 
In the base-case scenario, North Korea will 
pursue the same strategies that have kept its 
rulers on top for decades. Probably the key 
factor here is maintaining trade and invest-
ment flows from China and South Korea at 
levels adequate to satisfy the military and to 
generate survival rations for the masses. 
The Special Economic Zone (SEZ) at Kae-
song (some 50 miles from the South Korean 
border), created in 2003 and operated by the 
Hyundai Group, looms large here. It is used 
by some 120 South Korean manufacturers, 
who employ around 40,000 North Koreans at 
an average wage of about one-third of that 
The bulk of the country’s very limited resources 
go to maintaining a supersized army, developing and  
producing nuclear weapons and missile delivery  
systems, and providing a decent standard of living  
for the political and military elite.












paid for comparable work in the South. All 
told, South Korea has invested roughly $600 
million in Kaesong’s infrastructure. Managers 
from the South run the factories, bringing in 
the necessary capital, equipment and technical 
expertise. South Korea even supplies the elec-
tricity – straight across the demilitarized zone.
The SEZ is walled off from the rest of the 
city, with worker housing provided by the 
North Korean government. The government 
chooses the workers. And while the gross 
wage rate is about three times that of the av-
erage North Korean worker, it’s not known 
how much is diverted to government (and 
government officials’) accounts. 
Expansion of the SEZs would allow North 
Korea to bolster foreign exchange earnings 
without exposing the general populace to 
decadent Western influences. South Korea’s 
motives for maintaining the SEZ are more 
political than economic: low wages can go 
only so far in compensating for the ineffi-
ciency of running an island economy in the 
midst of a police state. But one would 
expect that North Korea would like to 
make the model sufficiently attractive 
to induce other companies (and other 
Asian countries) to outsource produc-
tion to isolated zones.
Whether this is practical is anyone’s 
guess. Foreign investors would have lit-
tle control over their work forces and 
no credible guarantee that their prop-
erty wouldn’t be confiscated. 
Muddling through would also re-
quire North Korea to play its hand 
deftly, using a mix of extortion and 
promises of détente to keep the cash 
flowing. This may not be so difficult, 
though, as long as China’s first priority 
is preventing a flood of refugees from 
North Korea and as long as South 
Korea considers the price of the status 
quo to be a bargain. 
Flirting with the Chinese Model 
Many observers doubt that the muddle-
through approach is sustainable in the 
long run. No matter how carefully the 
government tries to wall off the SEZs, 
news of conditions beyond North Korea’s bor-
ders are seeping through. And without some 
hope for a better life, North Koreans will in-
creasingly question the regime’s legitimacy. In-
deed, to judge by reports from refugees, this 
process has already begun. 
At some point, then, the government might 
well opt for economic liberalization as a 
t r e n d s
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means of quieting discontent. It wouldn’t be 
the first time: North Korea initiated a number 
of such changes in its economic system in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s. It was widely 
hoped at the time that these changes were the 
start of a trial-and-error process akin to Chi-
na’s reforms under Deng Xiaoping or Viet-
nam’s more recent economic liberalization 
initiatives. But in contrast to China and Viet-
nam, North Korea’s motives for reform 
smacked more of desperation than conviction 
that markets could legitimize the ruling elite.
In the 1990s, change was spurred by the 
collapse of the planned economy during the 
famine, when the public food distribution 
system designed to ensure survival rations 
ceased to function. As desperate North Kore-
ans sought ways to feed their families, black 
markets (supplied by food smuggled from 
China or grown in private plots) sprang up. 
In hindsight, the government’s decision to 
tolerate these markets seems purely tactical, 
unrelated to any larger vision of reform.
Reforms initiated in 2002 looked a bit 
more promising. Planning was partly ceded 
to local governments and factories. Wages 
were raised and linked to performance; prices 
for commodities were allowed to fluctuate ac-
cording to supply and demand. And it be-
came legal for families to sell food and con-
sumer goods in local markets. 
Note, too, that this was the time that the 
Kaesong special economic zone was estab-
lished, and the exchange rate significantly de-
valued in what looked like an effort to posi-
tion North Korea to compete in global markets. 
Eager to celebrate the opening of this bastion 
of autarky, analysts rushed to declare that the 
country had entered a new era. In the words of 
one, North Korea “crossed the Rubicon.” 
But in light of the timing, it’s more likely 
that the reforms were simply another tactical 
lurch. In other economies that have transi-
tioned from planning to markets, the state 
took the lead and tried to buttress the re-
forms by providing supporting institutions, 
like increased rule of law, property rights and 
regulatory reform. Marcus Noland of the Pe-
terson Institute for International Economics 
and Stephan Haggard of the University of 
California at San Diego note that the North 
Korean case turned reform on its head, with 
change arising not out of a conscious top-
down program, but as unintended (and in 
some respects, unwanted) byproducts of state 
failure. Comparisons have been made with 
the perestroika programs undertaken in des-
peration by Mikhail Gorbachev.
With free markets and no real institutional 
framework, North Korean refugees have re-
ported that the 2002 reforms benefit the elite 
who run and profit from them, while making 
ordinary citizens even more vulnerable to 
scarcities. 
While most North Koreans must now ob-
tain a portion of their food from private mar-
kets, prices are typically 10 to 40 times higher 
than prices for state-rationed food (which is 
only sporadically available). And since just a 
tiny minority can afford to buy food on their 
official wages, the reforms effectively turned 
almost everyone into a scofflaw, hoarding, 
smuggling and demanding bribes on their 
own turf when they were able.
In 2005, the regime reversed course, ban-
ning private trade in grain and seizing pri-
vately held stockpiles in rural areas. Women 
under 40, the main cohort of traders, were 
barred from participating in the markets. 
“Antisocialist conscience investigation teams” 
were deployed to shut down the remaining 
markets. And travel restrictions were strength-
ened, especially along the relatively porous 
Chinese border. The government also ex-
pelled a number of foreign aid agencies, in-
cluding the World Food Program, whose job 
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was to monitor the adequacy of food distri-
bution in areas prone to shortages.
A similar sort of haphazard reform and re-
versal was apparent in the currency “reform” 
initiated in November 2009. The government 
announced it would knock two zeros off its 
currency, the won, ostensibly to fight infla-
tion. People had just one week to trade in 
their old money for new notes, with each 
family permitted to exchange a maximum of 
100,000 old won for 1,000 new won – less 
than $30. Here’s the kicker: any cash in excess 
of the limit became invalid unless it was 
placed in bank accounts to which the deposi-
tors were not guaranteed future access. 
The life savings of what passes for a middle 
class in North Korea, along with merchants’ 
working capital, were wiped out with the stroke 
of a pen. Thousands of people frantically tried 
to convert soon-to-be-worthless money into 
something of value. Prices of some goods rose 
hundredfold before traders shut down, realiz-
ing that their profits soon would be worthless, 
too. (Besides which, the reform would leave 
them without the money to restock.)
If there was any method to this apparent 
madness, the purpose of the currency reform 
was to destroy the budding private entrepre-
neurial class and to return ebbing power to 
those who live off the proceeds of govern-
ment monopolies. While, in theory, virtually 
every adult works for the state, North Koreans 
do all they can to escape from its clutches. 
Farmers tend their own gardens as weeds 
overtake collective farms, and urban workers 
duck state assignments to peddle everything 
from metal scavenged from mothballed facto-
ries to televisions smuggled from China. Iron-
ically, to cushion the blow of the currency re-
form, workers were promised that their 
salaries would be restored – in effect, giving 
them a large pay raise since old nominal sala-
ries were now paid in the revalued currency. 
All this implies that the Chinese model, 
however attractive it might appear to foreign-
ers, does not mesh with the perceived inter-
ests of North Korea’s rulers. Perhaps they are 
too isolated from the realities of the global 
economy to see the necessity of enduring eco-
nomic reforms. Perhaps they know that they 
lack the technical skills to manage decentral-
ized markets. Or perhaps their control over 
the levers of power is too insecure to give 
them the leeway to experiment.
But the country may once again be head-
ing for a crisis in which business as usual sim-
ply won’t cut it. Indeed, just a few months ago, 
the government tacked back toward freer ex-
change, allowing local markets to stay open 
longer and to sell food without restriction in 
order to stave off the threat of mass starvation.
Sudden Collapse 
The fundamental economic collapse of a 
country with a huge conventional military, 
along with nuclear weapons and the means to 
deliver them, is without precedent. No one 
really knows, then, what would happen if al-
ready meager levels of production fell sharply, 
neighboring countries set conditions for 
helping that were unacceptable to North Ko-
rea’s leadership, and control over the popula-
The purpose of the currency 
reform was to destroy the 
budding private entrepre-
neurial class and to return 
ebbing power to those who 
live off the proceeds of  
government monopolies.
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tion was lost. But it is possible to make an ed-
ucated guess. 
It is likely that large numbers of North Ko-
rean refugees would flee to the borders of 
China and South Korea, as they did in the 
1990s famine. North Korea’s rulers might be 
reduced to making side deals in which their 
safety and wealth would be protected in re-
turn for assurance that the military would 
stay in the barracks. Ultimately, the process 
would lead to some form of union between 
North and South, as Southerners were moved 
to take on the burden of impoverished North-
erners by a combination of family ties, na-
tionalism, pressure from the West and eco-
nomic self-interest in ending the chaos. 
There is general agreement that whatever 
the terms on which the North was absorbed, 
the cost would be enormous. In the latest 
forecast, a South Korean government think 
tank estimated that the price of reunification 
would amount to 2 percent of GDP for the 
next 60 years. Another government study esti-
mated that renovating the North’s dilapidated 
infrastructure would cost at least $1 trillion. 
Foreign assessments are comparably 
daunting. In 2009, Credit Suisse estimated a 
cost of $1.5 trillion to raise North Korean in-
comes to 60 percent of those in the South. 
Peter Beck of Stanford believes that even this 
figure is far too low. He argues that raising in-
come levels in the North to 80 percent of 
those in the South would become a political 
necessity and would cost $2 trillion to $5 tril-
lion over 30 years. 
But as high as they are, such figures are 
probably manageable for a couple of reasons. 
First, because South Korea has prospered 
mightily over the last four decades: with a 
GDP of some $1.4 trillion in purchasing 
power terms and a future growth rate of per-
haps 3 percent, South Korea could spend $40 
billion on the North in 2011 without reduc-
ing its current living standard. And $40 bil-
lion would double North Korea’s income. 
Second, because the collapse of the North 
would allow the South to reduce its military 
outlays: while the South Korean defense bud-
get is a secret, according to the World Bank it 
amounted to 2.6 percent of GDP in 2006. If 
that percentage remained constant, the bud-
get was on the order of $30 billion in 2010. 
To put the issue in further perspective, 
consider western Germany, which has been 
subsidizing the former East Germany to the 
tune of $100 billion annually since 1991. 
While South Korea’s output is about half that 
of Germany, a comparable portion of the 
South Korean GDP would still amount to $50 
billion this year. And, if the Korean economy 
grew at a modest 3 percent annually, the fig-
ure would rise to $90 billion in two decades. 
through a glass, darkly
Ironically, no one (with the likely exception 
of a great majority of North Koreans) is eager 
to see North Korea collapse. Too much is at 
stake. China doesn’t want a flood of refugees; 
many South Koreans fear the consequences of 
the economic dislocation. And nobody wants 
to face the increased prospect of military con-
flict during the transition, especially now that 
the North has nuclear weapons. 
So the best guess is that, in the end, the 
North Korean regime and state will be given 
every opportunity to muddle through, 
whether or not it is willing to negotiate away 
its nuclear option. This doesn’t mean that the 
economy (and the government) won’t col-
lapse one day. Indeed, it is hard to imagine a 
state so incompetent and so lacking in popu-
lar support surviving indefinitely. But the 
push will probably have to come from within. 
Sadly, we may have gotten to the point where 
there are no longer optimists when it comes 
to North Korea – only realists. m
